Economic rationality and the optimization trap by Mukerji, Nikil & Nida-Rümelin, Julian
12 – Summer 2015
The theme of this issue of the St. Gallen Business Review is “Harmony”. For 
this reason, we would like to discuss whether two aspects of our lifeworld are 
in harmony, namely economic optimization and morality. What is the relation 
between them? According to a widely shared view, which is one aspect of the 
doctrine of “mainstream economics”, the functioning of an economic system 
does not require moral behaviour on the part of the individual economic agent. 
In what follows, we will try to convince you that this is false. If all economic 
agents – managers, employees, bankers, consumers and so on – were purely 
self-interested, as mainstream economics assumes, our economic practice 
would fail. There are various reasons for this. Here we will focus on one of 
them, namely the pivotal role of interpersonal communication.
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Economic success depends on successful 
communication
 It is fairly obvious that our economic system depends on effective communicative structures and processes between individuals. There are multiple reasons for this. One reason is the division of labour that is involved in economic production. 
Various different individuals produce the parts that are then assembled into a prod-
uct. In order to coordinate the activities between them effective communication 
processes are required. A further reason is trade. Our economic system is based 
on the idea that goods and services are exchanged between individuals for mutual 
benefit. This exchange process requires that the individual parties agree on the 
terms of the trade and this, in turn, requires an effective system of communication 
between them. It is thus obvious that effective communication is a prerequisite of 
a functioning economic system. Though true, this fact is rather easy to overlook 
because, as a well-known platitude has it, you never know what you have until you 
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lose it. Most of us seem to take communication for granted as its value only ever 
reveals itself when it becomes dysfunctional. Nevertheless, we have, as economic 
agents, an interest in suring up the basis of our communication with one another. 
But how is this possible? In order to understand this we need to dig a little deeper.
Communication is inherently moral
 What is necessary for successful interpersonal communication? We would like to illustrate our answer to this question by dissecting a typical communicative 
situation and laying bare its microstructure. Suppose two persons, call them Emily 
and Susie, discuss a more or less sophisticated issue, such as the question whether 
taxes should be lowered in order to stimulate the economy. Emily argues that lower 
taxes will stimulate growth because it will increase consumption. Susie objects that 
tax breaks are unlikely to result in increased consumption because they will mainly 
benefit the rich who spend a relatively smaller fraction of their income on consumer 
goods. The precise shape of the discussion shall not concern us here. What we are 
interested in is to spell out the conditions for successful communication between 
Emily and Susie. It is clear that Emily’s and Susie’s conversation will involve a large 
number of individual utterances through which they express their opinions. These 
utterances need to satisfy certain conditions if the communicative exchange be- 
tween them is to be successful. What are these conditions?
It is clear that Emily expects Susie to be honest in her utterances (and vice versa). 
She expects her to say what she really believes. If Emily thought that Susie did not 
really mean what she said, if she thought, say, that Susie merely wants to mess with 
her, Emily would presumably refuse to engage in the discussion with Susie. Their 
communication would fail. Honesty is, hence, one of the conditions of successful 
communication. It is not the only one, however. Honesty and truthfulness have to 
be separated. Susie’s opinions may be entirely untrue, even if she expresses them 
honestly. If Emily had reason to believe that most of what Susie says does not cor-
respond with reality, Susie would not seem to be a reliable communication partner. 
Reliability, i.e. the (likely) correspondence of a person’s beliefs with objective reality, 
is thus a further condition for successful communication. Finally, successful com-
munication depends on trust between communication partners. This trust has two 
aspects: a subjective and an objective one. Emily should believe that Susie says what 
she subjectively holds to be true and that it is, in all likelihood, objectively true (and 
vice versa). Even if Susie is honest and reliable, the communication between her and 
Emily would still fail if Emily did not trust her.
This précis of an interpersonal communicative situation makes clear that successful 
communication depends on conditions that are inherently moral. In order to make 
communication work each communication partner needs to follow certain rules. They 
need to be honest, reliable and trusting. Following these rules is not, however, in the 
immediate self-interest of either of them. Rather, it is for the sake of a cooperative 
communicative practice – a practice that benefits all.
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 At this point, it may be objected that, our aforemen- tioned reasoning notwithstanding, purely self-interest- 
ed individuals (or homines oeconomici, as they are referred 
to in economics) would be able to communicate success-
fully. After all, successful communication is in everybody’s 
self-interest. And is their self-interest not what they are 
after?
This reasoning involves a misstep in logic. Of course, 
self-interested individuals are motivated by their own 
self-interest. They will do what is best for them. This much 
is true by definition. But it does not mean that in a soci- 
ety of self-interested individuals each will do, individually, 
what is best for all. This is not a new insight. The political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously expounded it in his 
book Leviathan already back in the 17th century. And some 
decades ago economic game theory has begun to analyse 
scenarios in which the pursuit of individual self-interest is 
socially destructive. A famous illustration is the so called 
prisoners’ dilemma game, in which two prisoners, call them 
A and B, who have jointly committed a crime, are faced with 
the choice between ratting out their partner or keeping 
silent. The situation is such that it is always advantageous, 
from both prisoners’ perspective, to rat the other out. If A 
rats out B and B keeps silent, A will go free and B will be 
put in jail for life. The same goes vice versa. If, on the other 
hand, both rat each other out they both get 10 years in pris- 
on as opposed to the one year that both get if they both 
keep silent. In this situation, it would be best from A’s and 
B’s perspective if they both kept silent. This solution is, in 
Unrestrained economic optimization 
undermines our economic practice
the lingo of economists, Pareto optimal. However, it is in-
dividually advantageous, both from A’s and B’s perspective, 
to rat the other out – no matter what the other guy does. If, 
recall, A rats out B, A goes free if B keeps silent and gets 10 
years of imprisonment if B rats him out, too. This is (individ- 
ually) better than not ratting B out, which gets A one year 
of imprisonment in the first case and life in prison in the 
second. Hence, if A and B both act from their own personal 
self-interest, if they optimize their individual advantage, 
this will land them in an optimization trap.
As it turns out, then, the fact that successful commu-
nication is to everyone’s advantage does not imply that 
self-interested individuals will communicate successfully. 
They will adhere to the constitutive rules of successful com-
munication only when this is in their own personal self-in-
terest. They will, e.g., be dishonest only when it pays and 
this will gradually erode communication between them. 
If, as we have argued above, economic practice relies on 
successful communication, then purely self-interested in-
dividuals will not be able to sustain it. They will be trapped 
in optimization – just like the two prisoners.
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A plea for interdisciplinary 
thinking
 Our conclusion contradicts economic common sense. Nevertheless, we hope we have been able to make it 
plausible that unrestrained economic optimization would 
destroy our economic practice and land us all in an optimiza- 
tion trap. But even if we were not successful in doing that, 
we hope that we were at least able to raise your awareness 
for issues that transcend the boundaries of the economic 
domain. We hope that we were able to convince you that 
there are philosophical issues to do with our economic 
practice that are important and worthy of your atten- 
tion. In our view, the economics profession and society as a 
whole would benefit enormously if its practitioners would 
devote more attention to the philosophical foundations of 
their discipline. One obvious place where this idea could be 
implemented is the education system. Many economics and 
business curricula eschew philosophical topics – even at 
elite universities. And even the ones which do go into them 
usually do not train students in the kind of interdisciplinary 
thinking that is necessary in order to mediate the various 
aspects of our lifeworld. At Ludwig-Maximilians-Universi-
tät München, where both of us are based, we try to resist 
this trend. Following the famous PPE model (which stands 
for philosophy, politics and economics), which was first 
implemented at the University of Oxford in the 1920’s, we 
set up an executive degree programme called Philosophie, 
Politik, Wirtschaft (PPW) in 2005. The programme addresses 
itself to business executives as well as to leaders in politi-
cal and non-governmental organizations. It aims to reflect 
economic theory and practice in light of philosophical con-
siderations and with an eye towards policy implications. In 
the ten years since its inception the programme has been 
able to stimulate integrative discourse between the dis-
ciplines and has proven extremely successful in shaping 
and sharpening its graduates’ ability to make responsible, 
reasoned decisions in complex environments. This example 
shows that it is both possible and tremendously worthwhile 
to transcend the narrow bounds of mainstream economics 
and to try to bring economic theory and practice into har-
mony with its own foundations.
LMU Munich
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
was founded in 1472 and is one of the leading 
research universities in Europe. It encompass- 
es 18 faculties, which cover the whole range 
of contemporary scholarship, including hu-
manities and cultural studies, law, economics 
and social sciences, medicine and the natu-
ral sciences. Its philosophy faculty covers all 
areas of philosophy. It offers various degree 
programmes and specializations, including 
an extra-occupational degree programme in 
philosophy, politics and economics (Philoso-
phie, Politik, Wirtschaft).
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